In the First Gulf War, the new Apache attack helicopter had a good combat record, and it appeared that the attack helicopter was finally going to be survivable on the battlefield. However, in the late 1990's, we didn't want to use the Apaches we sent to Kosovo because of the air defenses. The Iraq war has shown that the attack helicopter is still vulnerable when many Apache's have been shot down or suffered irrepairable damage. Helicopter's have never seemed to survive well in combat, though they do provide very convenient mobility. The Vietnam war had a terrible record of helicopter losses. Helicopters do provide a mobility role far better than anything we have implemented yet, but the costs are enormous. Even rather primitive weapons can take most choppers down. Helicopters make no sense in the CAS(close air support) role, because they are too slow and expensive. The A10 jet and other fixed wing aircraft are much better for the CAS role. The A10 is much cheaper than the Apache or other attack helicopters. The A10 has similar loiter time, and are much more reliable. The A10 also has STOL(and rough terrain capability) so an attack helicopter's VTOL is not that much of an improvement. They are more survivable, and if they do get shot up somewhat, they are cheap and easy to maintain. We should also purchase some Super Tucano's or similar fixed wing aircraft as they are more of a true CAS type aircraft than an A10 is. Propeller aircraft can loiter over the battlefield, are cheap, are faster than helicopters resulting in higher survivability, and are reliable. Slow movers are better than fast movers for CAS because they are cheap and can loiter over the battlefield. This results in higher reliability for ground troops than multirole fighters. I think we'll have air superiority for at least the next 20 years with just our current crop of aircraft. So, there is really no reason to produce expensive F22's or F35's for enemies that won't be there. I do not see a full scale conventional war happening for at least another 20 years, so we have no need for new fighters. I'd rather see the money spent on 6th or 7th generation fighter research so we have a head start if a full scale conventional war breaks out in 20 years. Unless helicopters can drastically improve their survivability, they should be phased out of the CAS role, thus ending the attack helicopter. Anything that will greatly increase their survivability will probably also greatly increase their costs, imo, making them obsolete. The CAS role may itself be obsolete in the near future, but I'll save that for another thread. I think the Key West agreement needs to be changed to allow the Army to create their own fixed wing aircraft for the CAS role. I also think the Army and Air Force should merge again like they were in WW2.
There is much merit to this. Comparing a helo to an A-10, the A-10 is cheaper to build and operate and is very survivable. The fixed-wing plane is far more fuel efficient (reducing logistical load). Its comparative drawback is that fixed wing aircraft require runways and helos don't. Both aircraft have their own peculiar niche in CAS. In fluid situations fixed runways may not be feasible - particularly in rough terrain. But in a fluid situation air defenses may not be all that dense, so the helo is boss here. In a more stable situation, runways are feasible and air defenses can be expected to have stiffened up, hence the superiority of fixed wing in that situation. Because military operations require flexibility there is a powerful argument to having both. The A-10 is on life support. It is a Carter-era plane. They have been flown to death, and when the line was shut down all the production fixtures were destroyed. To bring back theA-10 will require an all-new design. And really the design does need to be refreshed. The A-10 was designed specifically to bust tanks. It was a response to the masses of tanks the Soviets had in eastern Europe. The plane was designed around the GAU-8 gun. Look at the layout. the designers literally started with the GAU-8 and built a plane around it. This 30mm Gatling gun was murder on tanks but really is not appropriate for the lighter targets seen today and envisioned in the future. A follow-on plane should be built around a 20mm gun or multiple .50 cal for anti-personnel or soft targets. The STOL F-35 is too expensive and requires a very, very skilled pilot. I don't think it replaces either the attack helo or the fixed wing CAS specialist. Likewise, CAS ("flying artillery" has its place in the scheme of things. Again, flexibility is the key. Anybody who says he can anticipate all the possibilities is a fool and deserves to be ignored. Tube artillery and rocket artillery are effective in many situations and should be the first choice if they work. But ground-pounder tell you there is still a place for a plane to deliver warheads on foreheads. If you have too few weapons systems, you simply the enemy's path to defeating your weapons systems. If you have a diverse enough set of weapons, the enemy simply cannot trump one system without becoming vulnerable to another. Key West needs to be revisited. The Air Force needs to have its mission redesigned. Its role should be air dominance and interdiction more than 20 klicks back from FEBA. Space command. Air and anti-missile defense. The Marines never bought into the idea of giving up CAS. As a result their CAS is simply the best. That's because the marines make a point that all Marines (including CAS aircrew) are riflemen first. So the CAS aircrew have an excellent feel for what the grunt needs. The Air Force has never been all that good at it.
I would agree that its time to phase out the attack helicopter. We only should have helicopters for troop deployment, insertions, or logistical support. We need to incorporate unmanned tech to replace them. Taxcutter hit on some very good points. The whole military purpose needs to be re-designed to be more efficient towards the threats we face today. There are too many cold-war era policies in place. The attack chopper is one such thing.
Never throw away flexibility. Dependence on a single system leave you easy to be defeated. Unmanned air vehicles are fine until somebody comes up with a way to jam them.
Exactly! Just look at how Iran got its hands on one of our drones. Overrode the remote instructions, and just made it land nice and safe and in tact at an Iranian air base.
Any aircraft you can hang a smart bomb on or mount a mini-gun/.50 cal., is potentially a close air support aircraft. In Afghanistan for example, the following fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft have been utilized in a close air support role: AV-8B F/A-18 F-15E F-16C AC-130U A-10 B-1B B-2 B-52D AH-1 AH-6 UH-1Y CH-47 CH-53 AH-64 HH-60 OH-58 RQ-1 MQ-1 MQ-9 While many are not doctrinally executed or described as close air support, they have been utilized to do so.
Gunships have 1 advantage that Fixed wing CAS aircraft don't: they can hover and provide fire from within feet of troops on the ground. That said, I do think we need to bring something like the OV-10 or A-1 Skyraider back in the arsenal.
Didn't they use some kind of stealth helicopter when they killed Bin Laden? I do not know much about warfare but it seems to me a helicopter can get in and out fast.
"Any aircraft you can hang a smart bomb on or mount a mini-gun/.50 cal., is potentially a close air support aircraft." Taxcutter says: Smart bombs can be fooled. (GPS jamming, laser spoofing, smoke, TV jamming, guidance link jamming)
The word "stealth" is thrown around a lot, but the military term is LO or Low Observable...no aircraft is invisible to radar, or detection. For the raid on Bin-Laden's compound in Pakistan, two UH-60 "Blackhawk" helicopters were modified to achieve a Low Observable radar signature, and flew lower to avoid detection...it also had noise reduction rotors, to avoid detection by it's decibel signature...the crew can also fly NOE or Nap of the Earth, following the terrain at low altitudes to avoid radar detection...all techniques used to achieve Low Observable status...but never truly "invisible". ECM or Electronic Counter Measures is another LO tactic an aircraft can utilize...electronic devices aboard the aircraft or aboard another aircraft orbiting in the vicinity of radar, can jam the radar signals or the means in which an aircraft can be detected electronically...ECM can also involve sending false returns, meaning the aircraft appears to be on radar in a different location than it actually is. So when you hear the word "stealth" think more along the lines of low observability rather than invisibility.